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Illinois v. Perkins: Approving the Use of Police
Trickery in Prison to Circumvent Miranda
Honorable Charles E. Glennon* and Tayebe Shah-Mirani**
I.

INTRODUCTION

Carving the deepest exception to Miranda v. Arizona' to date,
the United States Supreme Court in Illinois v. Perkins2 held that
the use of undercover agents to obtain a confession from an incarcerated suspect did not constitute custodial interrogation necessitating the administration of Miranda warnings.' The Perkins
Court overruled both the Circuit Court of St. Clair County, Illinois
and the Illinois Appellate Court for the Fifth Judicial District.
The Illinois courts had held that when an undercover police agent
interrogates a suspect in his jail cell about a separate, uncharged
crime without administering the Miranda warnings, any statements made during the interrogation are inadmissible at trial.'
The Illinois appellate court reasoned that a conversation between
an undercover agent and the suspect constituted custodial interrogation requiring Miranda warnings. 5
In reversing the Illinois appellate court, the Supreme Court held
that inculpatory statements are admissible absent Miranda warnings when "the suspect is unaware that he is speaking to a law
enforcement officer and gives a voluntary statement." 6 In so hold* Resident Circuit Judge, 11th Judicial Circuit. B.A. 1964, University of Illinois;
J.D. 1966, University of Illinois. Judge Glennon is the current chair of the Criminal Law
Committee for the Illinois Judicial Conference. He is also a lecturer at Regional Judicial
Seminars in the area of criminal law.
** B.A. 1985, Knox College; J.D. Candidate, 1991, Loyola University of Chicago
School of Law.
1. 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
2. 110 S. Ct. 2394 (1990).
3. Id. at 2396. In Miranda, 384 U.S. 436, the court promulgated procedural safeguards to protect a suspect's fifth amendment privilege against compelled self-incrimination. See infra notes 15-37 and accompanying text (Miranda discussion).
4. People v. Perkins, 176 Ill. App. 3d 443, 450, 531 N.E.2d 141, 146 (5th Dist. 1988),
appealdenied, 125 Ill. 2d 572, 537 N.E.2d 816 (1989), cert. granted, 110 S. Ct. 49 (1989),
rev'd, 110 S.Ct. 2394 (1990).
5. The appellate court stated that the agent's question inquiring whether Perkins had
ever "done someone" was reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response and thus
constituted interrogation. Perkins, 176 Il.App. 3d at 447, 531 N.E.2d at 144. See infra
notes 77-88 and accompanying text (discussion of the appellate court opinion in Perkins).
6. Perkins, 110 S.Ct. at 2396.
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ing, the Supreme Court determined that an undercover agent's
questioning of an incarcerated suspect was not custodial interrogation.7 According to the Court, custodial interrogation occurs and
consequently Miranda warnings are required only when the suspect is aware that the person to whom he is speaking is a law enforcement official. 8
This Article examines the Supreme Court's opinion in Perkins
and assesses its impact upon both police investigatory techniques
and judicial proceedings in Illinois. It begins with a discussion of
Miranda v. Arizona 9 and Rhode Island v. Innis,'° two landmark
decisions that define what constitutes custodial interrogation.,,
12
The Article then focuses on the decisions in the Illinois courts
and the Supreme Court, 3 analyzing the different rationales underlying the disparate conclusions of these courts. The conclusion dis4
cusses the potential difficulties unleashed by the Perkins decision.'
II.

CUSTODIAL INTERROGATION

A. Miranda v. Arizona
In Miranda v. Arizona, 5 the United States Supreme Court
struck the balance between the state's interest in prosecuting
criminals and an individual's liberty interest. The Court held that
in the absence of specific procedural safeguards or comparable
means, a confession obtained during custodial interrogation could
not be admitted into evidence against the accused at trial. I6 Moreover, the prosecution bore the burden of demonstrating that the
suspect was fully apprised of his fifth amendment privilege 7 and
that any waiver was knowingly and intelligently made.18 The
7. Id.
8. Id.
9. 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
10. 446 U.S. 291 (1980).
11. See infra notes 15-57 and accompanying text.
12. See infra notes 74-88 and accompanying text.
13. See infra notes 89-143 and accompanying text.
14. See infra notes 144-46 and accompanying text.
15. 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
16. Id.at 478-79.
17. U.S. CONST. amend. V provides in pertinent part: "[No person] shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself .... In Miranda, the Court
noted that "[tihose who framed the Constitution and the Bill of Rights were ever aware
of subtle encroachments of individual liberty. They knew that 'illegitimate and unconstitutional practices get their first footing by silent approaches and slight deviations from
legal modes of procedure.'" Miranda, 384 U.S. at 459. (citing Boyd v. United States, 116
U.S. 616, 635 (1886)).
18. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 479.
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Court stated that "the privilege [of the Fifth Amendment] is fulfilled only when the person is guaranteed the right 'to remain silent
unless he chooses to speak in the unfettered exercise of his own
will.' "19 More importantly, the Court believed that the fifth
amendment guarantee always was endangered during custodial interrogation conducted by government officials. 20 The Court explained that "[a]n individual swept from familiar surroundings into
police custody, surrounded by antagonistic forces, and subjected to
the techniques of persuasion'2 ... cannot be otherwise than under
[the] compulsion to speak." '
Although in pre-Mirandadecisions, the Court focused primarily
upon the use of physical force by the police in order to obtain a
confession,22 the Miranda Court noted that the "modern practice
of in-custody interrogation [was] psychologically rather than physically oriented. ' 23 Specifically, the Court identified as psychologically significant the use of incommunicado interrogation and
trickery in compelled confessions.24 This subtle form of coercion
casts doubt upon the voluntariness of a subsequently obtained confession. 25 Because the Court believed that an involuntary confes19. Id. at 460 (quoting Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1, 8 (1964)).
20. Id. at 445-458. The Court defined custodial interrogation as "questioning initiated by law enforcement officers after a person [was] taken into custody or otherwise
deprived of his freedom of action in any significant way." Id. at 444. For purposes of
Miranda, the Court has held that one can be in custody when detained by police officers
in his residence. Orozco v. Texas, 394 U.S. 324 (1969).
21. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 461.
22. Id. at 446 (citing Brown v. Mississippi, 297 U.S. 278 (1936)).
23. Id. at 448. This proposition was first articulated by the Court in Chambers v.
Florida, 309 U.S. 227 (1940). As noted by the Miranda Court, the Chambers Court
recognized "that coercion can be mental as well as physical, and that the blood of the
accused is not the only hallmark of an unconstitutional inquisition." Miranda, 384 U.S.
at 448 (quoting Blackburn v. Alabama, 361 U.S. 199, 206 (1960)).
24. Miranda,384 U.S. at 448. Custodial interrogations usually are conducted incommunicado, resulting "in a gap in our knowledge as to what in fact goes on in the interrogation rooms." Id. The Court opined that while in isolation, the suspect is more
susceptible to interrogation techniques that capitalize upon the suspect's confinement in
unfamiliar surroundings. The Court examined one interrogation technique that consisted
of relentless questioning of the suspect. During the course of this interrogation, questions
are phrased by the interrogator to confirm the belief held by the police, i.e., that they
know the suspect is guilty, rather than to discover what the suspect actually knew or did.
Id. at 449-450. The Court further noted that deception and trickery often are employed
to induce confessions. For example, "[t]he accused is placed in a line-up... [and] is
identified by several fictitious witnesses or victims who [associate] him with different offenses [than the one under investigation]. It is expected that the subject will become
desperate and confess to the offense under investigation in order to escape from the false
accusations." Id. at 453 (citing O'HARA, FUNDAMENTALS OF CRIMINAL INVESTIGATION 106 (1956)).
25. Id. at 455-57.

814
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sion is of suspect truthfulness and reliability, 26 a confession would,
be deemed voluntary only if the accused had been apprised of his
fifth amendment privilege prior to the custodial interrogation. The
Court reasoned that only with the full and informed knowledge of
fifth amendment rights could a subsequently obtained confession
be considered the true product of the suspect's free choice.27
To ensure that the accused was aware of his privilege against
self-incrimination, the Miranda Court promulgated procedures to
be followed by law enforcement officials prior to custodial interrogation. 2s The procedures, better known as the Miranda warnings,
required that the suspect:
be warned prior to any questioning that he has the right to remain silent, that anything he says can be used against him in a
court of law, that he has the right to the presence of an attorney,
and that if he cannot afford an attorney one will be appointed for
him prior to any questioning if he so desires.2 9
If after the Miranda warnings are given a confession is obtained,
a "heavy burden rests on the government to demonstrate that the
defendant knowingly
and intelligently waived his privilege against
30
self-incrimination."
In defining what constitutes a valid waiver, the Supreme Court
stated that waiver could not be presumed from the accused's silence. 31 Thus, unless the accused expressly indicated his willingness to speak in the absence of counsel, an interrogator could not
assume that his failure to request counsel constituted a waiver.32
Also, if the accused answered a few preliminary questions and subsequently invoked his fifth amendment rights, the prior responses
26. Id. at 448, 466.
27. Id. at 458.
28. Id. at 479.
29. Id.
30. Id. at 475. The Court placed this burden on the state because the "State [established] the isolated circumstances under which the interrogation [took] place and [had]
the only means of making available corroborated evidence of warnings given during incommunicado interrogation .. " Id. The Court further emphasized, "[tqhis Court has
always set high standards of proof for the waiver of constitutional rights ... and we reassert these standards as applied to in custody interrogation." Id. (citing Johnson v.
Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458 (1938)). In explaining these standards, the Court indicated that
even after the appropriate warnings have been given, the suspect must have the opportunity to exercise his rights throughout the questioning. Id. at 479.
31. Id. at 475. The Court stated, "[p]resuming waiver from a silent record is impermissible. The record must show, or there must be an allegation and evidence that show,
that an accused was offered counsel but intelligently and understandably rejected the
offer. Anything less is not waiver." Id. (quoting Carnley v. Cochran, 369 U.S. 506, 516
(1962)).
32. Id.
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would not constitute a waiver. 33 Most importantly, the Court expressly stated that "any evidence that the accused was threatened,
tricked or cajoled into a waiver [showed] that the defendant did
not voluntarily waive his privilege. '34 The court then concluded
that any confession obtained in the absence of Miranda warnings
or an informed waiver was inadmissible at trial.
Because the Miranda opinion applies only to custodial interrogation, much debate has centered upon the circumstances under
which an accused is indeed subjected to custodial interrogation. 35
As noted earlier, the Miranda Court defined custodial interrogation as questioning by authorities "when an individual is taken into
custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom in any significant
way."' 36 Since Miranda, the Supreme Court progressively has qualified and narrowed the definition of custodial interrogation and
thereby reduced the number of factual situations in which a person
will be found entitled to the protections of Miranda.37
B.

Rhode Island v. Innis

The catalyst of the narrowing of the definition of custodial interrogation was Rhode Island v. Innis.3" In Innis, the suspect, Innis,
was arrested for the murder of a taxicab driver. 39 At the time of
his arrest, the police administered the Miranda warnings and Innis
immediately requested counsel.' Innis subsequently received Miranda warnings two more times and declined to answer police
questions regarding the murder.4 While en route to the station,
three officers carried on a conversation regarding the whereabouts
of the shotgun, believed to be the murder weapon, and the possibil42
ity that a child might discover the weapon and injure himself.
33. Id. at 475-76.
34. Id. at 476.
35, See, e.g., Kamisar, Brewer v. Williams, Massiah and Miranda: What Is "Interrogation?," When Does It Matter? GEO. L.J. 1 (1978); Smith, The Threshold Question in
Applying Miranda: What Constitutes Custodial Interrogation?, 25 S.C.L. REV. 699
(1978).
36. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 478.
37. See, e.g., Oregon v. Mathiason, 429 U.S. 492 (1977); Beckwith v. United States,
425 U.S. 341 (1976).
38. 446 U.S. 291 (1980).
39. Id. at 293-94.
40. Id. at 294.
41. Id.
42. Id. at 294-95. The following conversation ensued between the officers:
Officer Gleckman: At this point, I was talking back and forth with Patrolman McKenna stating that I frequent this area while on patrol and [that because a school for handicapped children is located nearby,] there's a lot of
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Innis interrupted the conversation and requested that the officers
return to the scene of the arrest where he would reveal the location
of the gun.43 Before Innis was questioned about the gun, he was
again given Miranda warnings."4 Innis responded that he "understood those rights, but that he 'wanted to get the gun out of the
way because of the kids in the area in the school.' ,,45 Subsequently, Innis revealed the gun's location."
After Innis was indicted for the murder, his attorney moved to
suppress the shotgun and the statements pertaining to its discovery. 47 The trial court allowed the shotgun and statements into evidence, concluding that because Innis repeatedly was appraised of
his Miranda rights, he intelligently waived his right to silence. 4
The court did not determine whether the officers had in fact interrogated Innis. Thereafter, Innis was convicted. 49
On appeal, the Rhode Island Supreme Court held that Innis had
invoked his right to counsel and "contrary to Miranda's mandate
that, in the absence of counsel all custodial interrogation then
cease, the police officers in the vehicle had 'interrogated' the respondent without a valid waiver of his right to counsel." 50 The
court reasoned that, although the police officers genuinely may
have been concerned about child safety and never directly addressed Innis, their conduct subjected Innis to "subtle coercion"
that was the equivalent of interrogation within the meaning of the
Miranda opinion. Moreover, the evidence was insufficient to support a finding of waiver." The United States Supreme Court
granted certiorari to address the meaning of "interrogation" under
Miranda.2
handicapped children running around in this area, and God forbid one of them
might find a weapon with shells and they might hurt themselves.
Officer McKenna: I more or less concurred with him [Gleckman] that it was
a safety factor and that we should, you know, continue to search for the weapon
and try to find it.
Officer Williams: He [Gleckman] said it would be too bad if the little-I
believe he said a girl-would pick up the gun, maybe kill herself.
At this point in the conversation, Innis requested that the officers turn the car around so
he could show them the location of the gun. Id.
43. Id. at 295.
44. Id.
45. Id.
46. Id.
47. Id. at 295-96.
48. Id. at 296.
49. Id.
50. Id.
51. Id.
52. Id. at 297.
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The Innis Court defined interrogation as "not only ... express
questioning, but also ... words or actions on the part of police
(other than those normally attendant to arrest and custody) that
the police should know are reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response from the suspect."' 53 In determining whether interrogation occurred, the Court focused on the perceptions of the
suspect and not on the intent of the police officers.5 4 The examining officers' intent was significant only to the extent that it reflected
whether the police knew or should have known that their words or
actions were reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response. 5
Applying its definition of interrogation to the facts of the case
before it, the Court held that although the officers' conversation
arguably did constitute "subtle compulsion," such compulsion did
not rise to the level of interrogation. Consequently, the Court concluded that Innis' statements were not the product of custodial interrogation and therefore were admissible.5 6 In its Innis decision,
the Court grafted an additional requirement onto the applicability
of Miranda warnings and their attendant safeguards. Specifically,
the suspect had to perceive the compulsion in order for police questioning to constitute custodial interrogation." In so holding, the
53. Id. at 301. The Court reasoned that psychological ploys are tantamount to direct
questioning "because they generate similar pressures, anxieties, and intimidation. They
are not only calculated to, but likely to evoke incriminating statements. They 'endanger
the privilege against self-incrimination' no less than does more readily identifiable 'interrogation.'" Kamisar, supra note 35, at 7. See also Graham, What Is "CustodialInterrogation?": California'sAnticipatory Application of Miranda v. Arizona, 14 UCLA L. REV.
59 (1966).
54. Innis, 446 U.S. at 302-303. See Marks, Confusing the Fifth Amendment with the
Sixth: Lower Court Misapplication of the Innis Definition of Interrogation, 87 MICH. L.
REV. 1073, 1082-83 (1989).
55. Innis, 446 U.S. at 303. The Court noted:
the intent of the police . ..may well have a bearing on whether the police
should have known that their words or actions were reasonably likely to evoke
an incriminating response. In particular, where a police practice is designed to
elicit an incriminating response from the accused, it is unlikely that the practice
will not also be one which the police should have known was reasonably likely
to have that effect.
Id. at 302 n.7.
56. Id. at 303.
57. One oft-quoted legal scholar clearly has articulated the necessary interplay between custodial interrogation and the suspect's perception:
It is the impact on the suspect's mind of the interplay between police interrogation and police custody--each condition reinforcing the pressures and anxieties
produced by the other-that, as the Miranda Court correctly discerned, makes
'custodial police interrogation' so devastating. It is the suspect's realization
that the same persons who have cut him off from the outside world, and have
him in their power and control, want him to confess, and are determined to get
him to do so, that makes the 'interrogation' more menacing than it would be
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Court departed from the proposition that, under a fifth amendment
analysis, a custodial atmosphere inherently was coercive.
III.

PEOPLE V. PERKINS

A.

Facts

In March of 1986, Donald Charlton, an inmate in the Graham
Correctional Facility, Hillsboro, Illinois, informed Agent Kenneth
Korunka of the Department of Criminal Investigation that another
inmate, Lloyd Perkins, had confessed to murdering someone in
East St. Louis, Illinois. ss When the police were contacted in the
East St. Louis area, the details of the murder coincided with an
unsolved murder in Fairview Heights, Illinois. 9 A Fairview
Heights police investigator held a taped interview with Charlton at
the Graham Facility in March 1986. 60 Subsequently, Charlton
agreed to cooperate in the investigation and was promised nothing
in return.6 '
When Perkins was released from the Graham Facility, investigators obtained a court order releasing Charlton to contact Perkins
while wearing an electronic surveillance device.62 Before contact
was made, Perkins was incarcerated on aggravated battery charges
in the Montgomery County Jail, Hillsboro, Illinois. 63 Believing
that the use of an eavesdrop device in jail would prove impracticable and dangerous, the police devised a sophisticated scheme to
procure Perkins' confession." Both Charlton and an undercover
police agent, John Parisi, were placed in the same jail cell with
Perkins. 65 Charlton and Parisi's presence in the jail would be explained by the ruse that both had escaped from a work-release program at the Graham Facility and were arrested when they ran out
of money and attempted a burglary.66 Both Parisi and Charlton
were instructed not to question Perkins about the murder and only
without the custody and the 'custody' more intimidating than it would be without the interrogation.
Kamisar, supra note 35, at 63.
58.

People v. Perkins, 176 Ill. App. 3d 443, 444, 531 N.E.2d 141, 142 (5th Dist.

1988). Charlton was serving a six-year prison sentence for burglary. Id.
59.
60.
1972).
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.

Id.
Brief for Petitioner at 3, Perkins, 176 Ill. App. 3d 443, 531 N.E.2d 141 (No. 88Id.
Id.
Id.
Perkins, 176 Ill. App. 3d at 445, 531 N.E.2d at 143.
Id.
Id.
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to engage him in conversation.67
Once in the jail cell with Perkins, Parisi suggested that the three
men plan an escape from the jail.6 A conversation ensued regarding the possibility of a shooting occurring during the breakout.69
At this point, Parisi "initiated the defendant's narration of the
crime by asking [Perkins] whether he had ever 'done someone.' ",70
In addition, Parisi and Charlton asked more than sixteen follow-up
questions pertaining to the murder and Perkins responded in
graphic detail.71 Miranda warnings were not given prior to Parisi's
questioning of Perkins.72 Subsequently, Perkins was arrested for
the murder of Stephenson. Only after this arrest did Perkins receive Miranda warnings.73
Subsequently, at Perkins' murder trial, the court granted Perkins' motion to suppress the statements made to Parisi and Charlton. 74 The court held that Parisi and Charlton were governmental
agents who failed to administer Miranda warnings prior to a custodial interrogation. 75 The State appealed to the Fifth District Appellate Court on the sole issue of whether Miranda was violated.76
B. State Appellate Court Decision
On appeal, the State argued that Miranda was inapplicable because the jail cell conversation did not constitute interrogation.77
Additionally, the State reasoned that despite the jail cell setting,
the conversation had not occurred in the sort of coercive environment that requires the police to give Miranda warnings.78 In the
State's view, tricking Perkins into discussing the details of the
crime was distinct from compelling Perkins to speak about the
murder because Perkins believed he was confiding in a confederate. 79 Thus, unless Perkins perceived that Charlton and Parisi
were governmental agents capable of controlling Perkins' fate, it
could not be said that Perkins was subjected to a coercive
67. Brief for Petitioner at 4.
68. Perkins, 176 I11.
App. 3d at 445, 531
69. Brief for Petitioner at 5.
70. Perkins, 176 Il1. App. 3d at 445, 531
71. Brief for Petitioner at 5-9.
72. Perkins, 176 I1.App. 3d at 446, 531
73. Id. at 445-46, 531 N.E.2d at 143.
74. Id. at 446, 531 N.E.2d at 143.
75. Id.
76. Brief for Petitioner at 10.
77. Perkins, 176 Il. App. 3d at 446, 531
78. Id.
79. Id. at 446, 531 N.E.2d at 144.

N.E.2d at 143.
N.E.2d at 143.
N.E.2d at 143.

N.E.2d at 143.
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environment.80
The appellate court rejected the State's arguments and affirmed
the trial court's suppression of the confession. The court reasoned
that for purposes of Miranda, Perkins was in custody even though
the crime for which he was incarcerated was distinct from the
Relying on Mathis v.
crime for which he was interrogated."
82
UnitedStates, the court noted that "nothing in the Miranda opinion [made] the necessity for warnings dependent on the particular
reason why the defendant [was] in custody.1 s3 Next, the court explained that Perkins was in fact interrogated because "the placement of Parisi in the cellblock with the defendant, and Parisi's
inquiry whether the defendant had ever 'done someone,' were
words and actions reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response from the defendant."'" The court expressed its concern
that allowing an undercover governmental agent to ask questions
of a suspect without Miranda warnings essentially would allow the
police to do indirectly what they are not permitted to do directly.
Specifically, the court worried that the State's argument if accepted
would allow police officers to circumvent Miranda merely by deceiving the suspect as to the interrogator's identity. 5
The court concluded that the surreptitious tactics employed by
80. Id. Additionally, the State argued that the jail setting was not coercive because
Perkins was familiar with incarceration and therefore was immune from the intimidating
atmosphere of prison. Id.
81. Id. at 447, 531 N.E.2d at 144.
82. 391 U.S. 1 (1968).
83. Perkins, 176 Ill. App. 3d at 447, 531 N.E.2d at 144 (citing Mathis v. United
States, 391 U.S. 1 (1968)). In Mathis, the Court held that a suspect interrogated regarding a new, uncharged crime, while incarcerated for a prior crime, was in custody for
purposes of Miranda. The actual reason for the custodial detention did not have to correspond with the substance of the interrogation. Mathis, 391 U.S. 1, 4-5 (1968).
84. Perkins, 176 Ill. App. 3d at 447, 531 N.E.2d at 144. The court relied on the
definition of interrogation that the Supreme Court articulated in Rhode Island v. Innis,
446 U.S. 289 (1980); see supra notes 38-57 and accompanying text. Also, the court relied
on decisions rendered in other jurisdictions that similarly interpreted the application of
the Innis Court's holding. See Holyfield v. State, 101 Nev. 793, 711 P.2d 834 (1985)
(when police utilized undercover career prison-informant to obtain information from an
incarcerated suspect about a separate uncharged crime, the police ploys subverted "constitutional guarantees which [were] designed to assure fairness and integrity in the truthseeking process"); State v. Fuller, 204 Neb. 196, 281 N.W.2d 749 (1979) (when police
gained the cooperation of an inmate to solicit incriminating information from his
cellmate, the testimony was held inadmissible. "[S]ince the [cellmate] was acting as a
police agent, this was custodial interrogation and the defendant was entitled to warnings."); State v. Travis, 116 R.I. 678, 360 A.2d 548 (1976) (when undercover police officer
was placed in defendant's cell dressed as a hippy and engaged the suspect in a conversation, the trickery employed violated the fifth amendment).
85. Perkins, 176 111. App. 3d at 449, 531 N.E.2d at 145-146 (citing Miranda, 384 U.S.
at 469). The court reiterated, "[t]he defendant's fifth amendment constitutional privilege
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the police intentionally subverted Perkins' constitutional rights.
Consequently, his statements were not given through a knowing
and intelligent waiver of those rights. 86 The Illinois Supreme
Court denied the State's petition for leave to appeal.87 Thereafter,
the United States Supreme Court granted certiorari.88
C.

The Supreme Court Majority Opinion

In an eight-to-one decision, with Justice Brennan concurring in
the result, the United States Supreme Court reversed the Illinois
appellate court and held that the use of an undercover agent to
solicit incriminating statements from an incarcerated suspect about
a crime distinct from the crime for which he was incarcerated, did
not constitute "custodial interrogation."8 9 The Court stated that
Miranda was not implicated in this situation and the defendant
was not entitled to warnings before being questioned by an undercover agent. 9° It noted that the concerns that underlie the Miranda decision are not present when an undercover agent is
utilized.9 ' The Court explained that Miranda exists to preserve the
fifth amendment privilege under circumstances that involved the
inherently compelling pressures generated by incommunicado interrogation in a police-dominated atmosphere. 92 Under the facts of
Perkins, the Court did not find the existence of pressure sufficient
to undermine the defendant's will and to compel him to speak
when he would not otherwise do so.93 The Court stated that "[t]he
essential ingredients of a 'police-dominated atmosphere' and compulsion are not present when an incarcerated person speaks freely
to someone that he believes to be a fellow inmate."94 Defining cois thus fulfilled only when the agent of the prosecution warns the defendant of his rights
pursuant to Miranda prior to custodial interrogation." Id.
86. Id. at 449-450, 531 N.E.2d at 146. The court further explained, "[t]he judiciary
must apply constitutional rights, even under new and perhaps difficult circumstances, or
the 'constitution would indeed be as easy of application as it would be deficient in efficacy
and power. Its general principles would have little value and be converted by precedent
into impotent and lifeless formulas. Rights declared in words might be lost in reality.' "
Id. at 450, 531 N.E.2d at 146 (citing Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349, 373 (1910)).
87. People v. Perkins, 125 Ill. 2d 572, 537 N.E.2d 816 (1989), cert. granted, 110 S.Ct.
49 (1989).
88. Illinois v. Perkins, 110 S.Ct. 49 (1989).
89. Illinois v. Perkins, 110 S. Ct. 2394, 2396 (1990).
90. Id. at 2399.
91. Id. at 2397.
92. Id. (citing Miranda, 384 U.S. at 445).
93. Id. at 2397.
94. Id.
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ercion from the perspective of the suspect, 9 the Court reasoned

that a coercive atmosphere is not present if the suspect believes
himself to be speaking with cellmates. 96 Pressures sufficient to
weaken the suspect's will occur only if a suspect knows he is speaking to a government official who appears to control his fate.9 7
Here, although there was technically both "custody" and "interrogation," the Court held that the defendant's ignorance of his interrogators' identities prevented a finding of sufficient coercion and
therefore negated a finding of custodial interrogation.9"

The Court also expressly approved the use of subterfuge in a
prison setting.99 The majority stated that "Miranda forbids coercion, not mere strategic deception by taking advantage of a sus-

pect's misplaced trust in one he supposes to be a fellow
prisoner." 1 " The Court decidedly rejected Perkins' argument that
the reliability of such confessions was questionable because inmates
frequently boast about alleged criminal activities to other prison01 The Court concluded that Miranda was not meant to shelers. 1
ter an inmate who speaks at his own peril "motivated solely by the
desire to impress his fellow inmates." 10 2
The Court found further support for its conclusion that undercover interrogation was not violative of the Fifth Amendment in its
decision in Hoffa v. United States.10 3 In Hoffa, the Court held that

undercover agents could be used to investigate a suspect not in custody. " In addition, the Hoffa Court determined that even though

an undercover agent tricked the suspect into believing he was a
trusted friend, this did not affect the "voluntariness of the state95. Id. (citing Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291, 301 (1980)).
96. Id.
97. Id. The Court explained that compelling pressures are generated when the suspect perceives that the police will reward or penalize him, depending upon how he responds to their inquiries. Id. at 2397-98.
98. Id.
99. Id. at 2397.
100. Id. (ploys to mislead a suspect or lull him into a false sense of security that do
not rise to the level of compulsion or coercion to speak are not within Miranda'sconcern)
(citing Oregon v. Mathiason, 429 U.S. 492, 495-496 (1977); Moran v. Burbine, 475 U.S.
412 (1986) (when police fail to inform suspect of attorney's efforts to reach him, neither
Miranda nor fifth amendment require suppression of prearraignment confession after voluntary waiver)). With jails overrun by gangs and violence, it is conceivable that a prisoner would believe that a fellow inmate could influence his fate within the prison.
Clearly, this is one reason why the use of undercover agents in prison can be so effective.
101. Perkins, 110 S. Ct. at 2398.
102. Id. This conclusion fails to recognize that many prisoners actively lie to project
a "tough guy image" to ensure their physical safety.
103. 385 U.S. 293 (1966).
104. Perkins, 110 S. Ct. at 2398.
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ments."'' 5 Although the Court noted that unlike Perkins, Hoffa
was not in custody, the Court determined that the fact of custody
did not warrant a presumption that a confession was involuntary
without a showing of compulsion." The Court further discounted
the importance of custody alone, by distinguishing Mathis v.
United States.° 7 The Court stated that in Mathis the suspect knew
he was dealing with a government official while in custody and for
this reason alone, Miranda applied. 108
The Court also rejected Perkins' argument that those decisions
holding that the sixth amendment prohibits the use of undercover
agents once the prosecution has commenced applied equally to a
fifth amendment analysis.lI9 The Court explained that this line of
cases was not applicable because the sixth amendment protected
the accused's right to counsel and prohibited government interference with that right only when the suspect was charged with the
crime.11° At the time of Perkins' encounter with the agent, "no
charges had been filed on the subject of the interrogation"; therefore, the sixth amendment was not implicated.'11
Finally, the Court rejected Perkins' argument that a bright-line
test was necessary to effectuate the purposes of Miranda."2 The
Court rejected this contention concluding once again that the interests protected by Miranda were not implicated when an undercover agent interrogated a suspect." 3
105. Id.
106. See supra note 57 and accompanying text (discussing Innis' departure from the
proposition that a custodial atmosphere inherently was coercive).
107. 391 U.S. 1 (1968). Significantly, the Court overtly indicated its desire to limit
Miranda by stating, "[t]he bare fact of custody may not in every instance require a warning even when the suspect is aware that he is speaking to an official, but we do not have
occasion to explore that issue here." Perkins, 110 S.Ct. at 2398.
108. Perkins, 110 S.Ct. at 2398 (emphasis added).
109. Id. at 2398-99. See Kuhlmann v. Wilson, 477 U.S. 436 (1986); Maine v.
Moulton, 474 U.S. 159 (1985); United States v. Henry, 447 U.S. 264 (1980); Massiah v.
United States, 377 U.S. 201 (1964) (when charges were filed on the subject of the interrogation, the use of undercover agents to deliberately elicit an incriminating response was a
violation of the sixth amendment right to counsel). However, the Court was willing to
limit this long standing principle. In Kuhlmann, the Court held statements admissible
under the sixth amendment, when an undercover informant was placed in a jail cell with
the defendant to listen for inculpatory statements. The Court held that the informant
must take some action to induce a statement before the trickery employed constitutes
deliberate elicitation. Kuhlmann, 477 U.S. at 456-57.
110. Perkins, 110 S.Ct. at 2398-99.
111. Id.
112. Id
113. Id.
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The Concurring Opinion

In a concurring opinion, Justice Brennan agreed that the suspect
must know that his interrogator is a police agent before such questioning amounts to interrogation in an "inherently coercive" environment requiring application of Miranda.114 To Justice Brennan,
the only issue before the Court was whether "Miranda [applied] to
the questioning of an incarcerated suspect by an undercover
agent.""' 5 The concurring Justice emphasized that "[n]othing in
the Court's opinion [suggests] that, had respondent previously invoked his Fifth Amendment right to counsel or right to silence, his
statements would be admissible. If respondent had invoked either
right, the inquiry would focus on whether he subsequently waived
the particular right.""1 6
Although Justice Brennan agreed that the requirements of Miranda were not implicated, he was highly critical of the police tactics employed in Perkins and concluded that the police conduct
"[raised] a substantial claim that the confession was obtained in
violation of the Due Process Clause. ' 7 Because fundamental fairness is at issue under a due process analysis, the techniques of custodial interrogation are as significant as the voluntariness of the
statements."" For Justice Brennan, the unfairness readily was ap114. Id. (Brennan, J., concurring).
115. Id. at 2399 (Brennan, J., concurring).
116. Id. Justice Brennan further suggested that "[slince respondent was in custody
on an unrelated charge when he was questioned, he may be able to challenge the admission of these statements if he previously had invoked his Miranda rights with respect to
that charge." Id. (Brennan, J., concurring) (citing Arizona v. Roberson, 486 U.S. 675
(1988)).
117. Id. at 2399 (Brennan, J., concurring). Justice Brennan further explained:
This Court has long held that certain interrogation techniques, either in isolation or as applied to the unique characteristics of a particular suspect, are so
offensive to a civilized system of justice that they must be condemned under the
Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment ....
Although these decisions framed the legal inquiry in a variety of different ways, usually through the
'convenient shorthand' of asking whether a confession was 'involuntary,' Blackburn v. Alabama, 361 U.S. 199, 207 (1960), the Court's analysis has consistently been animated by the view that 'ours is an accusatorial and not an
inquisitorial system,' Rogers v. Richmond, 365 U.S. 534, 541 (1961), and that,
accordingly, tactics for eliciting inculpatory statements must fall within the
broad constitutional boundaries imposed by the Fourteenth Amendment's guarantee of fundamental fairness.
Id. at 2399-2400 (Brennan, J., concurring) (quoting Miller v. Fenton, 474 U.S. 104, 109110 (1985)).
118. Id. at 2400 (Brennan, J., concurring). Justice Brennan expounded upon the
need for fundamental fairness in investigative techniques:
The abhorrence of society to the use of involuntary confessions does not turn
alone on their inherent untrustworthiness. It also turns on the deep-rooted feel-
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parent in Perkins.'19 The police fabricated an elaborate escape
scheme to gain Perkins' confidence when he was imprisoned on an
unrelated charge.'2 ° Moreover, Perkins' confinement enabled the
government to control Perkins' environment and barrage him with
questions in a manner calculated to induce a confession.' 2'
In light of the due process implications, Justice Brennan suggested that on remand the Illinois Court apply the well-established
"totality of the circumstances" test to determine if the police conduct violated due process.122 In conclusion, Justice Brennan concluded that there was strong evidence supporting the exclusion
of
123
Perkins' confession as a violation of the Due Process Clause.
Justice Brennan disagreed with the majority's conclusion that
the Court's holding would not be difficult to apply in practice because the use of undercover agents was a recognized law enforcement technique.' 24 The concurring Justice contended that "[a]s
the methods used to extract confessions [become] more sophisticated, a [court's] duty to enforce federal constitutional protections
[does] not cease. It only [becomes] more difficult because of the
more delicate judgments to be made."' 25
ing that the police must obey the law while enforcing the law, that in the end
life and liberty can be as much endangered from illegal methods used to convict
those thought to be criminals as from the actual criminals themselves.
Id. (Brennan, J., concurring) (quoting Spano v. New York, 360 U.S. 315, 320-321
(1959)).
119. Id. (Brennan, J., concurring).
120. Id. (Brennan, J., concurring).
121. Id. (Brennan, J., concurring). Justice Brennan believed that the testimony
before the Court indicated that Perkins was barraged with questions until he confessed.
Id (Brennan, J., concurring).
122. Id. at 2400-01 (Brennan, J., concurring). Under the "totality of the circumstances test," the admissibility of a defendant's statements depends solely upon whether
they were voluntary within the meaning of the due process clause. The due process
clause proscribes the use of statements obtained by unduly offensive means or "under
circumstances in which the suspect clearly had no opportunity to exercise a 'free and
unconstrained will.'" Oregon v. Elstad, 470 U.S. 298, 304 (1985) (quoting Haynes v.
Washington, 337 U.S. 503, 514 (1963)).
123. Perkins, 110 S. Ct. at 2400-01. Justice Brennan noted that "[tihe deliberate use
of deception and manipulation by the police appears to be incompatible 'with a system
that presumes innocence and assures that a conviction will not be secured by inquisitorial
means,' and raises serious concerns that respondent's will was overborne." Id. at 2400
(Brennan, J., concurring) (citation omitted).
124. Id. at 2401. See supra notes 103-13 and accompanying text (use of undercover
agents discussed).
125. Perkins, 110 S. Ct. at 2401 (Brennan, J., concurring) (citing Spano, 360 U.S. at
321).
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The Dissenting Opinion

In a dissenting opinion, Justice Marshall argued that the Court
was indeed carving an exception into the Miranda opinion. 126 The
dissenting Justice contended that Miranda clearly applied here because the suspect was interrogated by an agent of the police while
in custody. 127 Justice Marshall asserted that, in the absence of Miranda warnings, Perkins' confession was inadmissible. 128 Justice
Marshall disagreed with the majority's distinguishing this case
from Miranda based on the suspect's lack of knowledge as to the
true identity of his interrogators. Justice Marshall stated that such
a distinction enabled police to circumvent Miranda's requirement
of informing a suspect of his constitutional129rights merely by using
undercover agents to extract a confession.
Justice Marshall criticized the majority's assertion that Perkins
was not in custody "because he was familiar with the custodial
environment as a result of being in jail for two days and previously
spending time in prison."' m Noted that familiarity with confinement "[did] not transform.., incarceration into some sort of noncustodial arrangement,"' 31 Justice Marshall also criticized the
Court's characterization of Parisi's thirty-five minute interrogation
as a "conversation."' 132 Parisi asked "a series of questions designed
to elicit specific information about the victim, the crime scene, the
weapon, Perkins' motive, and his actions during and after the
shooting."' 133 In short, Parisi's conduct subjected Perkins to direct
questioning and created a substantial likelihood that Perkins would
incriminate himself.134
Justice Marshall also disagreed with the majority's focus on the
perceptions of the suspect in determining whether custodial interrogation occurred. Arguing that such a focus misapplied Miranda,'35 Justice Marshall emphasized that "Miranda was not...
concerned solely with police coercion ...[but] with any police tactics that may operate to compel a suspect in custody to make in126. Id. (Marshall, J., dissenting).
127. Id. (Marshall, J., dissenting).
128. Id. (Marshall, J., dissenting).
129. Id. (Marshall, J., dissenting).
130. Id. (Marshall, J., dissenting).
131. Id. (Marshall, J., dissenting) (citing Orozco, 394 U.S. 324). The State pressed
this point in the Illinois appellate court. See supra note 80 and accompanying text.
132. 110 S.Ct. at 2401 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
133. Id. at 2402 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
134. Id. (Marshall, J., dissenting) (citing Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291, 300-01
(1980)).
135. Id. at 2402 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
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criminating statements without full awareness of his constitutional
rights."'' 36 For Justice Marshall, police deception and trickery are
police to
synonymous with compulsion because they enable the
37
rights.
constitutional
of
suspect
the
forego appraising
. Additionally, Justice Marshall argued that prison inherently was
coercive and enabled the police to exploit the suspect's insecurities.' 3s The control that the prison authorities exercise over the jail
cell environment places the suspect in a position of defenselessness.' 39 The police exploited Perkins' psychological vulnerability
by inducing him to discuss his prior killing to demonstrate his ability to kill if necessary in the proposed escape plan.14° For Justice
Marshall, the exploitation of a psychological vulnerability operated
to the same effect as physical coercion; the suspect's ignorance of
his interrogator's identity did not eliminate this coercion.' 4 '
Finally, Justice Marshall emphasized the Court's prior conviction that a bright-line test was necessary to provide clear constitutional guidelines for law enforcement officials. 4 2 The dissenting
Justice opined that the majority's holding exacerbated the lack of
clarity already present in the application of Miranda. Justice Marshall noted that Miranda had been formulated in an attempt to
provide a definitive test for the preservation of an individual's fifth
amendment privilege. According to the dissent, by refusing to apply Miranda in a case that so clearly fell within its scope, the majority only confused and complicated the intended simplicity of
Miranda.143
136. Id. (Marshall, J.,dissenting) (citing Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 468
(1966) and Estelle v. Smith, 451 U.S. 454, 467 (1981)) (emphasis in original).
137. Id. (Marshall, J., dissenting).
138. Id. at 2403 (Marshall, J., dissenting). Justice Marshall explained, "[t]he psychological pressures inherent in confinement increase the suspect's anxiety, making him
likely to seek relief by talking with others." Id. (Marshall, J., dissenting).
139. Id. at 2403 (Marshall, J., dissenting). Justice Marshall stated that:
[b]ecause the suspect's ability to select people with whom he can confide is completely within [government] control, the police have a unique opportunity to
exploit the suspect's vulnerability. In short, the police can insure that if the
pressures of confinement lead the suspect to confide in anyone, it will be a police
agent.
Id. (Marshall, J., dissenting) (quoting White, Police Trickery in Inducing Confessions, 127
U. PA. L. REV. 581, 605 (1979)). See also Dix, Undercover Investigation and Police
Rulemaking, 53 TEx. L. REv. 203 (1975).
140. Perkins, I10 S.Ct. at 2403 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
141. Id. (Marshall, J., dissenting).
142. Id. (Marshall, J., dissenting).
143. Id. at 2404 (Marshall, J., dissenting). Justice Marshall aptly noted,
if Miranda now requires a police officer to issue warnings only in those situations in which the suspect might feel compelled to speak by the fear of reprisal
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IMPACT

Although the Perkins decision clarified the applicability of Miranda to the questioning of prisoners held on unrelated charges by
undercover police officers, the decision creates a wealth of new
problems and ambiguities. Most significantly, the decision rejects
the Miranda presumption that an interrogation while in police custody is presumptively coercive. After Perkins, trial courts must determine the "voluntariness" of a confession on a case-by-case basis.
Mere custodial interrogation will no longer suffice to preclude use
of an accused's self-incriminating statements. Affirmative evidence
of coercion must now be introduced to warrant exclusion of such
statements. As a result of this case-by-case approach, law enforcement authorities undoubtedly will go for the "outer limits" of propriety until informed by courts as to what investigatory
"techniques" will be tolerated.
A second problem posed by the Perkins decision lies in the difficulty of evaluating the reliability of the prisoner/jail cell informant. Because the informant may either be accused or convicted of
a crime, the reliability of evidence obtained from an inmate clearly
is in doubt.'" Inmates do not usually qualify as good samaritans,
testifying or informing on their fellow inmates in an effort to see
justice done. More realistically, inmates look for concrete rewards:
"good time" credit against their sentence, a change of cell, a better
job assignment, or transfer to a more desirable prison facility in
exchange for testimony. Thus, the extensive use of jail cell inforor at best, "inaccurate"
mants could promote a flood of perjured,
45
recollections of alleged statements.
Use of non-police, jail cell informants places the jury in the inevfor remaining silent or in the hope of more lenient treatment should he confess,
presumably it allows custodial interrogation by an undercover officer posing as
a member of the clergy or an attorney hired by others to represent the prisoner.
Although such abhorrent tricks would play on a suspect's need to confide in a
trusted adviser, neither would cause the suspect to think that the listeners have
official power over him.
Id (Marshall, J., dissenting) (citations omitted).
144. Reliability of such evidence clearly is in doubt in some situations as recently has
been pointed out in a series of California cases in which the convict/stoolie later admitted
perjuring himself in numerous cases: The convict virtually had been a professional witness for California in all manner of cases, relaying fabricated jailhouse confessions to
authorities.
145. The problem is compounded by the fact that lay witnesses, lacking the professional training of police officers, have considerable difficulty in recounting detailed conversations such as that reported by the police officer in Perkins. Although wiring a jail
cell informant with a microphone and tape recorder would limit the errors in transmission of a jail cell confession, in many instances "body wires" are too risky. A suspect
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itable position of trying to determine which of two prisoners is
more reliable, the accused or the informant. Once the trial court
has determined that the alleged inculpatory statements are admissible into evidence, the jury must decide how to treat these statements. To assist jurors in this determination, an instruction could
be given to the jury during the course of the trial at the time they
are called upon to consider the informant's testimony. Illinois Pattern Instruction 3.17, Testimony of an Accomplice, could be used
as a template for this proposed instruction. 46 Using this instruction, the court could inform the jury that "when a prisoner claims
that another prisoner has confessed to a crime, or has made an
incriminatory statement concerning a crime, such testimony is subject to suspicion and should be considered with caution. It must be
carefully examined and weighed with all the other evidence in the
case."
It is unlikely that similar instructions would be necessary when
an undercover police officer has been used to obtain a jail cell admission or incriminatory statement. Such testimony obviously is
not subject to the same inherent unreliability factors as fellow inmate reported confessions, although it may be subject to other unreliability factors. Police officers are not motivated by the same
concerns as inmates, and thus when a trained police officer recounts the details of the alleged confession, the testimony is more
readily accepted. Although undercover police officer testimony
still is subject to challenge as to veracity, bias, and other credibility
factors, a specific instruction beyond that generally given to jurors
as to non-undercover police officer testimony would not appear
necessary.
A final problem posed by Perkins concerns its impact on the
practices of law enforcement investigation. The Perkins decision
arguably allows the police to question surreptitiously already incarcerated individuals regarding any unrelated crimes. Additionally, because the Court now requires positive proof of coercion
before Miranda becomes applicable, law enforcement officials are
apt to use multiple forms of trickery and deceit to obtain inculpatory remarks from the accused. Because trickery undoubtedly is
more cost effective than nondeceptive methods of investigation, the
may discover the wire and further efforts of interrogation would be entirely futile if not
dangerously foolhardy.
146. I.P.I. sec. 3.17 (Crim.) (2d ed. 1981). This section provides, "[w]hen a witness
says he was involved in the commission of a crime with the defendant, the testimony of
that witness is subject to suspicion and should be considered by you with caution. It
should be carefully examined in light of the other evidence in the case." Id.
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police quickly will develop a multitude of techniques designed specifically to deceive the accused. Moreover, the decision could result in less than thorough investigations. It is not uncommon for
law enforcement officials to curtail, if not abandon, their investigation once a confession has been obtained.
V.

CONCLUSION

The Perkins Court's finding that surreptitious questioning of an
incarcerated suspect by an undercover police officer does constitute
custodial interrogation carved the deepest exception to the Miranda rule to date. The coercive deception tacitly approved in Perkins intrinsically is at odds with the original goals of Miranda and
the protections of the fifth amendment. Whereas Miranda held
that custodial interrogation was presumptively coercive, the Perkins court required an actual showing of coercion even if a person
is interrogated while in custody. This new standard in evaluating
the voluntariness of a confession imposes a substantial burden on
the trial courts that now must determine when a particular deceptive practice amounts to coercion. The courts undoubtedly will
struggle with developing some guidelines for determining when a
trick or a deceptive practice causes a statement to become involuntary. Because the Supreme Court has presented no guidelines for
making such a determination, confusion and debate are likely to
abound over the question in the future.

